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Flexicurity has been heralded as the solution to simultaneously maintain the well-being of
employees through employment security while allowing employers to benefit from flexibility.
This paper examines one of the claimed benefits that countries with flexicurity policies will
reduce the stress on employees who experience job insecurity. More specifically, it is argued
10 that more generous unemployment benefits along with active labour market policies to
facilitate rapid re-employment reduces the anxiety associated with insecurity. Analyses of
two international data sets found little evidence for this moderation of the link between
insecurity and well-being in countries that are assumed to be exemplars of flexicurity. The
economic rationality behind these claims is questioned, and a psychological approach to job
15 insecurity is suggested as an alternative.
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Introduction
The European Union’s (EU) labour markets have
20 been undergoing many changes over the past few
decades, sometimes in response to specific EU pol-
icies (for instance enlargement or to increase labour
market participation) and in other cases in response
to global economic, political and technological
25 changes. These changes have often been accompa-
nied by concerns that the quality of jobs will suffer
if labour markets become more flexible. More spe-
cifically, there is a widespread apprehension that
many of these changes will result in a reduction
30 in job security. The solution that has dominated
EU policy discourse over the past decade has been
‘‘flexicurity’’. This paper examines one of the
claims made about the way flexicurity policies
can combine macro-level economic efficiency with
35protection of the workforce from the negative
consequences of job insecurity.
Job insecurity
Job insecurity has received much attention over the
past two decades from social scientists, and much is
already known about its effects. To provide a con-
40text for this paper, some important points from that
literature will be summarised, although a full
review of the literature would be redundant given
several other recent comprehensive reviews
(Sverke et al., 2002; Burchell, 2005; De Witte,
452005; Cheng and Chan, 2008).
Firstly, it is important to be clear what we mean
by job insecurity, as there is much confusion and
inconsistency in the literature. For this paper, job
insecurity is defined as an employee’s perception of
 The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.
For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2009, 1–14
doi:10.1093/cjres/rsp021
CAMRES rsp021 PA
Journal Name Art. No. CE Code
NOT FOR
PUBLIC RELEASE
50 the likelihood of the losing his or her current job
involuntarily, say in the next 6 or 12 months. This is
clearly not an objective measure, and indeed there is
evidence that, in representative surveys, many more
employees are worried about losing their jobs than
55 will actually lose them (Dickerson and Green,
2006). However, if we are concerned with their
‘‘subjective’’ well-being, then their ‘‘perceptions’’
of the risk of job loss are important per se, even if
those fears are exaggerated or unfounded. For
60 instance, their anxiety will be a function of their
own assessment of the risk of losing their jobs, as
will the effect of job insecurity on their job search
behaviour, their work motivation and on their lon-
ger term planning of decisions concerning housing
65 and fertility. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, no
attempt is made to measure the objective likelihood
of job loss nor will job insecurity be measured by
proxy through measures of average job tenure or
turnover rates. These measures correlate poorly at
70 best with subjective job insecurity (OECD, 1998);
as Turnbull and Wass (1999) show, involuntary job
losses make up only a small minority of quits even
in recessions in the UK. And, cross-nationally,
there is no link between subjective job insecurity
75 and turnover—e.g. Denmark has a relatively short
average tenure but high levels of subjective job
security (Auer, 2007). Finally, job contracts have
also been used in some studies as a measure of job
insecurity, although this is again unsatisfactory. As
80 Booth et al. (2000) argue, international differences
in the prevalence of temporary job contracts reflect
differences in employment protection legislation
(EPL) more than differences in job security.
Secondly, it is important to note that job insecu-
85 rity is not only studied because of what might
follow—unemployment or re-employment in
a lower paid or lower quality job. Numerous studies
have shown that the very perception that one is
likely to lose one’s job is itself sufficient to cause
90 symptoms of anxiety and depression. The magni-
tude of this effect is not trivial; typically the differ-
ence on measures of psychological well-being
between secure and insecure employees is about
the same size as the difference between the means
95 for all employees and the unemployed (Burchell,
1994). This finding has been replicated consistently
across a number of surveys, both cross-sectional
and longitudinal. Furthermore, qualitative studies
have provided rich descriptions of the nature of
100individuals’ concerns about losing their jobs. Nolan
(2002, 2009) analysed semi-structured interviews
of UK employees to explore these concerns and
found that the most widely expressed worries for
both men and women are straightforwardly
105economically based, for instance worries about
not being able to pay the mortgage or other bills.
Other anxieties expressed also included less nar-
rowly focussed economically based concerns, such
as the stress of not being able to plan for the future
110or concern about one’s role as breadwinner in the
household.
There has been much heated debate about the
changing patterns of job insecurity over time. Many
social commentators and social theorists have taken
115for granted that there has been a recent dramatic rise
in job insecurity and have even characterised the
current era as ‘‘the age of uncertainty’’. Fevre
(2007) criticises these extravagant claims and, like
several others (Felstead et al., 2000; Green, in
120press), shows that levels of job insecurity have been
quite stable in most industrial countries over the
1990s and the early 2000s (at the time of writing,
we do not have good evidence of the effect of the
‘‘credit crunch’’ on job insecurity, although it is
125probable that there has been a significant rise in
2008 and 2009). There is virtually no good time-
series data on subjective job insecurity before the
1990s, but an analysis of retrospective data does
point strongly to a period of low levels of job
130insecurity in the UK in the 1950s and 1960s, fol-
lowed by a significant rise between the late 1970s
and the mid-1980s, coinciding with the dramatic
increase in unemployment that characterised the
early Thatcher period (Burchell, 1993, 2002).
135When journalists, academics and policy-makers
started to discuss the implications of high levels of
job insecurity in the early 1990s, this was accom-
panied by calls for policies that would return us to
the low levels of job insecurity that marked the
140‘‘golden era’’ following World War II. In the UK,
criticisms of job insecurity were continuously
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levelled at John Major’s Conservative government,
with calls for stronger job protection measures, and
some companies adopted ‘‘Zero Redundancy’’ pol-
145 icies (Burchell et al., 2002). There were promises
that things would be better under Labour, although
after the 1997 election job insecurity slid off the
political agenda with MP Peter Hain’s move from
the shadow Employment office to the Welsh Office.
150 As Glyn and Wood (2000) argued, with New
Labour there was a clear message that a competitive
and flexible labour market was more important than
EPL. Evidence for the effect of EPL on job security
is mixed, but the analyses by Clark and Postel-
155 Vinay (2005) suggests, surprisingly, that EPL actu-
ally reduces job security.
Flexicurity
This perceived pessimistic dichotomy, that job se-
curity and labour market flexibility are mutually ex-
clusive, came to an end when Denmark and the
160 Netherlands proposed that it was possible to ‘‘have
your cake and eat it’’—to simultaneously achieve
employment security and flexibility. Thus, a new
term was created, ‘‘Flexicurity’’. The definition of
security had moved on, from being secure in one’s
165 current job, to a more generalised knowledge that
one will be employed, but not necessarily for the
same employer. Income security was also important,
and thiswas addressed in flexicurity policies through
ensuring that the unemployment benefits were gen-
170 erous enough to avoid hardship in periods between
employment. Denmark is regularly held up as an
example to other EU member states. For instance,
in the EU 2007 Communication on flexicurity, it is
stated that ‘‘The Danish labour market shows a suc-
175 cessful combination of flexibility and security, of-
fering flexible labour laws and relatively low job
protection, extensive efforts on lifelong learning
and active labour market policies, and a generous
social security system’’ (36). The Netherlands also
180 receives high praise with its ‘‘drastic reduction of
unemployment and a strong job creation’’ (37) in
the 1990s attributed to its flexicurity policies.
Definitions of flexicurity vary, but there are four
central themes according to Wilthagen and Tros
185(2004). Firstly, employers should have the ability
to hire and fire without undue cost or bureaucratic
constraints, thus achieving productive systems that
can respond rapidly to changes in demand caused
inter alia by technological innovation, changing
190fashions, business cycles or market fluctuations.
But employees need to be protected from the
welfare costs of such fluctuations. Thus, the second
ingredient of flexicurity is generous levels of unem-
ployment benefits, so that the loss of a job is not
195aggravated by poverty in unemployment. The third
ingredient is active labour market policies promot-
ing training and employability, so that unemployed
workers can be rapidly provided with marketable
skills that will hasten their return to employment.
200And, finally, it is assumed that this win–win situa-
tion will be maintained by a high-trust dialogue be-
tween the social partners whereby the antagonistic
relationships between employers, trade unions and
government are replaced by cooperation and nego-
205tiated compromise to maintain this balance, thus
optimising economic and welfare costs and benefits.
Several welfare benefits ought to arise from this
model. Firstly, economic efficiency, it is assumed,
will keep economic growth high and unemploy-
210ment low. Secondly, those individuals who are
unfortunate enough to become unemployed should
have the advantages of a training system that gives
them the ability to achieve rapid re-employment;
thus, unemployment, and particularly long-term un-
215employment, should be kept low. These arguments
have been set out in the European Commission’s
Green Paper on labour law and flexicurity in 2006,
and then advocated more strongly in the European
Commission’s 2007 communication. These pro-
220posals have generally been welcomed by the social
partners, although some scepticism has been
expressed. For instance, John Monks, General Sec-
retary of the European Trade Union Confederation,
has questioned whether the security components of
225flexicurity are a sop, ‘‘a cover for less employment
protection, and for weaker labour law’’ (2007).
Finally, there is the implicit assumption that job
insecurity will no longer be such a source of anxiety
or depression, as employees will be more confident
230that, even if they do lose their job, they will
½AQ1
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experience neither long-term unemployment nor
great financial loss. As the 2007 communication
states, ‘‘Workers need sufficient security to plan
their lives and careers.’’ (7). This final perceived
235 benefit of flexicurity policies is a plausible claim,
but one that has not been subject to empirical test.
Flexicurity policies are built upon a ‘‘homo eco-
nomicus’’ model of well-being. It is assumed that
the effects of job insecurity are harmful to the in-
240 dividual because of fears about the economic con-
sequences of job loss and unemployment.
Following on this line of logic (i.e. softening the
economic consequences of job loss through more
generous unemployment benefit levels and rapid
245 re-employment), it is argued that the effects of job
insecurity on well-being can be ameliorated.
But the economic consequences of job insecurity
and possible job loss might be just one minor com-
ponent of the psychological impact. A similar ques-
250 tion, concerning the reasons for the poor
psychological well-being during periods of unem-
ployment, has caused an ongoing debate among
psychologists for many decades. Certainly, in the
1930s, there was clear evidence of extreme poverty
255 among the unemployed in the town of Marenthal
and also clear evidence that the families with higher
incomes faired better when the main breadwinner
became unemployed (Jahoda et al., 1933).½AQ2 There is
evidence that, with the greater affluence in more
260 recent times, the economic effects of unemploy-
ment are no longer the main mechanisms account-
ing for the low well-being of the unemployed.
Jahoda (1982) was one of the first to argue that
while the manifest reason for employment is finan-
265 cial, the effects of unemployment on psychological
health are now more attributable to latent aspects of
employment. Jahoda listed five such latent aspects
of employment: structured time, enforced activity,
social contact, identity and a collective purpose.
270 This spawned a number of similar theories, embel-
lishments and critiques (e.g. Fryer, 1986; Warr,
1987), including some specifically to test whether
economic or social and psychological variables are
better predictors of psychological symptoms in
275 unemployment (Fryer, 1992; Nordenmark and
Strandh, 1999).
Countries that have adopted flexicurity-type pol-
icies are not claiming to have eradicated job inse-
curity—far from it, employers being able to hire
280and fire without rigid obstacles is central to flexi-
curity. Rather, we would expect that those countries
that have adopted flexicurity policies will have
ameliorated the link between job insecurity and
poor psychological well-being.
285This paper sets out to test this particular claim. If
it is true, then one would expect the correlation be-
tween the perceived risk of losing one’s job and
psychological well-being to be reduced in countries
that are closer to the ideal flexicurity model (such as
290Nordic countries) than countries that are purportedly
characterised by rigidities in employment legisla-
tion and practices, and by the absence of active
labour market policies (such as someMediterranean
countries). Note that there may still be differences in
295the aggregate levels of subjective well-being be-
tween countries that are attributable to a number
of other factors, both actual and methodological.
For instance, there may be real differences in well-
being attributable to social capital, and there may be
300differences in cultural norms concerning the
responses to questionnaire items asking about
symptoms of malaise, or nuanced differences in
the translation of questionnaire items measuring
well-being. Consequently, the data analysis section
305of this paper is not interested in differences in the
mean levels of well-being between countries, but
rather in differences between the relationship of per-
ceived job insecurity with well-being. In order to
test this more thoroughly, two different data sets will
310be used, the European Working Conditions Survey
(EWCS) 2005 and the European Social Survey
(ESS) 2006. They have slightly different measures
of job insecurity, and very different measures of
well-being, so that the analysis of two different data
315sets (if they arrive at similar conclusions) should
make a stronger case than either analysis alone.
The European working conditions
survey
The EWCS is a repeated cross-sectional survey
of working conditions, health and safety matters,
Burchell
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320 quality of working life and well-being. The
fourth wave was conducted in 2005, and
included a total of 31 countries: all the EU25
countries, Romania and Bulgaria (which joined in
2007), Norway and Switzerland, and Turkey and
325 Croatia. The sample size was 1000 in larger
countries and 600 in smaller countries, interviewed
in their own homes. Respondents were drawn
from the population of employees and the self-
employed who normally worked for at least
330 1 hour/week.
Measures
Job security was measured by asking ‘‘How much
do you agree or disagree with the following state-
ment describing some aspects of your job’’; one of
335 the list of items was ‘‘I might lose my job in the
next 6 months’’. Responses were to ‘‘Strongly
agree’’ (5.5%), ‘‘Agree’’ (9.7%), ‘‘Neither agree
nor disagree’’ (11.9%), ‘‘Disagree’’ (26.0%),
‘‘Strongly disagree’’ (41.5%), ‘‘Don’t know’’
340 (5.0%) and ‘‘Refusal’’ (0.5%).
1
Well-being was measured by first asking ‘‘Does
your work affect your health or not?’’. Respondents
who answered yes were then asked ‘‘How does it
[your job] affect your health?’’ and were presented
345 with a list of possible health problems from work.
Previous exploratory analyses (Burchell et al.,
2007) had divided the list of symptoms into sub-
scales that were related to ergonomic problems (e.g.
backache), toxic environments (e.g. skin problems)
350 and stress. The stress sub-scale was used here con-
sisting of ‘‘Headaches’’, ‘‘Stomach aches’’, ‘‘Heart
disease’’, ‘‘Stress’’, ‘‘Overall fatigue’’, ‘‘Sleeping
problems’’, ‘‘Anxiety’’ and ‘‘Irritability’’. As can
be seen in Figure 1, there is clear evidence, as one
355 would expect, of a relationship between job insecu-
rity and this measure.
The crucial question is whether this relationship
is moderated by each country’s level of flexicurity
policies.
360 Figure 2 depicts the correlations graphically for
each country (Spearman’s q non-parametric corre-
lations are used as both variables are highly
skewed). It can be seen that for the majority of
countries the correlation is positive, such that
365higher insecurity is associated with more stress-
related symptoms; three countries have unexpected
negative correlations (Portugal, Malta and Slov-
enia), but these are all very weak and are not
statistically significant.
370One country, Turkey, has a higher correlation
than any other by a small but clear margin. This
provides some supporting evidence that the lack
of flexicurity policies leads to the effects of job
insecurity being more severe. As Tangian (2008)
375argues, Turkey practices, in many ways, the
extreme opposite of flexicurity policies. It has strict
EPL (OECD, 2004), and simultaneously a very
high proportion of employees do not have a contract
of employment. According to Tangian’s (2008)
380analysis of the 2005 EWCS, Turkey has the highest
coefficients of both flexibility and precariousness.
The stark economic facts of Turkey’s labour market
do indeed suggest that insiders have less to worry
about, while those who worry about losing their
385jobs do indeed have a lot to worry about, as
unemployment benefits are low and the gap
between insiders and outsiders is wide.
Beyond this one case, however, there seems to be
no evidence of any further ‘‘systematic’’ differen-
390ces between the countries. One might have
expected, for instance this correlation to be lower
in the Nordic countries, but there is little or no
evidence for this. For example, Denmark and the
Netherlands, widely given as the two good practice
395examples of flexicurity (e.g. Kok et al., 2003), are
both mid-table. Countries that are considered to be
low on flexicurity policies such as Ireland, Italy and
Spain are at the lower end of the table. Prima facie,
the rank-ordering of countries on this criterion
400makes no intuitive sense and is uncorrelated with
any of the indices of flexicurity or related indices
(such as difficulty of hiring, difficulty of firing, EPL
(see Philips and Eamets (2007) and Tangian (2008)
for summaries).
405Before attempting to explain this lack of relation-
ship, the ESS (2006) data set will also be examined
for evidence of the moderating effect of flexicurity
policies on the relationship between job insecurity
and well-being.
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European social survey (2006)
410 The the ESS is a biennial multicountry repeated
cross-sectional survey covering over 30 nations.
The third round, which was conducted in 2006,
surveyed 30,949 people in total (including the un-
employed and economically inactive). It is a ran-
415 dom, nationally representative sample of
individuals.
Measurements
Job insecurity was measured by asking ‘‘How
likely would you say it is that you will become
420 unemployed in the next 12 months. Would you
say it was .’’. Responses were ‘‘Very likely’’
(2.2%), ‘‘Likely’’ (5.1%), ‘‘Not very likely’’
(19.6%) or ‘‘Not at all likely’’ (25.8%) and also
‘‘Not applicable’’2 (45.2%), ‘‘Refusal’’ (0.1%),
425 ‘‘Don’t know’’ (1.9%) and ‘‘No answer’’ (0.2%).
This question is clearly different from the EWCS in
two main respects: the 12-month reference period
instead of the 6-month period, and it specifies ‘‘be-
coming unemployed’’ rather than ‘‘losing your
430job’’. Both measures are what psychologists ½AQ3cate-
gorise as cognitive measures of job insecurity (i.e.
measuring likelihood), rather than affective meas-
ures (typically measuring the level of worry or con-
cern about job security); thus the two questions are
435excellent variants for a constructive replication.
In fact, if the mean job insecurity is computed for
each of the countries included in both the EWCS4
and the ESS3, then the ordering of the countries is
remarkably similar with no country far from the
440regression line, as shown in Figure 3 (a curve fits
the data even better, but that is not relevant here).
The ESS contains more conventional measures
of well-being than the EWCS, reinforcing the use-
fulness of these two surveys for a constructive rep-
445lication. Respondents were instructed ‘‘I will now
read out a list of the ways you might have felt or
Figure 1. Simple relationship½AQ24 between job insecurity and well-being (source: EWCS4).
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behaved during the past week. Using this card,
please tell me how much of the time during the past
week.’’ (the response scale on the card was none
450 or almost none of the time, some of the time, most
of the time, all or almost all of the time, don’t
know). The 10 items in the list were subject to an
exploratory factor analysis, which produced a clear
two-factor solution. The Eigen values for these two
455 factors were 4.09 and 1.12, with a third (non-
extracted) Eigen value of 0.81; the two extracted
factors accounted for 52% of the total variance.
These two factors when rotated orthogonally
(Varimax) corresponded to one factor loading on
460symptoms of anxiety and depression and one factor
corresponding to quality of sleep:
Anxiety and depression items (factor loadings in
parentheses)
 you felt sad? (0.75)
465 you felt lonely? (0.73)
 you felt depressed? (0.70)
 you felt bored? (0.65)
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Figure 2. Non-parametric correlations between job insecurity and stress-related illnesses in 31 countries (source: EWCS4).
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Figure 3. Country scatterplot: two measures of job insecurity (sources: EWCS4 and ESS3).
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 you felt anxious? (0.61)
 you felt that everything you did was an effort?
470 (0.52)
Quality of sleep items:
 you felt really rested when you woke up in the
morning? (0.82)
 you felt calm and peaceful? (0.66)
475  you felt tired? (0.62)
 you felt that your sleep was restless? (0.56)
As there were two orthogonal well-being scales, the
analyses were repeated for each scale.
The analyses were attempted to replicate as
480 closely as possible the analyses with the EWCS
data. Again, we can start by inspecting the relation-
ship between job insecurity and well-being sepa-
rately for each of the measures. As can be seen in
Figures 4 and 5, in both cases we observe a mono-
485 tonic relationship, as expected, showing that as job
insecurity increases, there is a corresponding
increase in symptoms of anxiety and depression
and decrease in the quality of sleep.
Yet again the analyses produced no evidence of
490any systematic differences between countries in the
relationship between job insecurity and either of the
two well-being scales (unfortunately Turkey, which
gave the strongest evidence from the EWCS anal-
yses, is not represented in the ESS3 data).
495In a final attempt to find any evidence of the
effect of flexicurity policies on the relationship be-
tween job insecurity and well-being, the countries
were banded into groups corresponding approxi-
mately to welfare regimes. Such clusters were based
½AQ4500on the widely adopted clusters based on Esping-
Andersen’s (1999) theory of welfare types. Other
authors are critical of this particular clustering and
point out that these clusters are flawed for other
types of analyses, such as when considering work-
505ing conditions (Pen˜a-Casas and Pochet, 2009).
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to
Figure 4. Job insecurity and symptoms of anxiety and depression (source: ESS3).
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develop clusters that specifically correspond to
qualitatively or quantitatively different types of
flexicurity policies within Europe.
510 Separately for each of the two well-being meas-
ures, the mean scores were calculated for each
country cluster by job insecurity cell. These results
are plotted in Figures 6 and 7.
Let us examine Figure 6 carefully (note that, to
515 overcome the small numbers of cases in the cate-
gories ‘‘very likely’’ and ‘‘likely’’ to become
unemployed, these two categories were combined,
but this did not change the results of the data anal-
ysis). Firstly, it is clear that there are systematic
520 differences between the three lines, showing the
effect of job insecurity on well-being, and this dif-
ference is significant if an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) model is computed (F(2, 12,012) =
78.7, p < 0.0005). Similarly, there are highly
525 significant differences between country groups
(F(4, 12,012)= 134.5, p < 0.0005), although this
may be an artefact of translation or culture. Most
interestingly, though, for the present analyses, is
whether the lines in Figure 6 show any deviation
530from being parallel—in other words, has the gap in
well-being been reduced by flexicurity policies?
Figure 6 does show some weak evidence of this,
such that the ‘‘continental countries’’ are more
widely spread in well-being than the other country
535clusters, and this is just significant at the 5% level,
but not at the 1% level (interaction term: F(8,
12,012) = 2.3, p = 0.017). Thus, there is no evi-
dence that the Nordic countries have succeeded any
more than the Southern, Eastern or Anglo-Saxon
540countries in this respect.
Figure 7 shows the same analyses for the mea-
sure of sleep disruption. Again, there is clear
evidence of the effects of job insecurity on quality
of sleep for each of the country groupings (F(2,
54512,012) = 42.4, p < 0.0005), and again there is clear
evidence of a difference in the level of this variable
Figure 5. Job insecurity and quality of sleep (source: ESS3).
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between country groupings (F(4, 12,012) = 46.6,
p < 0.0005). But the big question is whether the
job insecurity effect varies between country group-
550ings, or more specifically whether the gap has been
reduced in the Nordic countries. There was little
evidence of this, either visually from this graph or
from the ANOVA (F(2, 12,012) = 2.4, p = 0.012).
There was some narrowing of the gap for the Scan-
555dinavian and Netherlands group, but the effect was
exceedingly weak (partial g2 = 0.002) and on the
borderline of significance even with a sample size
of well over 10,000.
Since the absence of the moderating effect of
560flexicurity was surprising, a number of further
ANOVAs were conducted with the ESS data to
add in other variables that might have been masking
the moderating effect. But even when gender, age,
education, occupation, industry, contract and part-
565time/full-time were added into the model in turn,
there was still no evidence whatsoever that some
country groupings had managed to uncouple
psychological well-being from job insecurity.
Discussion
The lack of evidence for the effectiveness of flex-
570icurity policies to protect employee well-being from
the effects of job insecurity is surprising, but a num-
ber of different analyses on two different data sets
have failed to find the evidence that was sought.
Apart from the stronger correlation between job in-
575security and well-being in the case of Turkey, little
or no other evidence was found of flexicurity as
a moderator of this relationship. Firstly, some pos-
sible reasons for this will be suggested, before con-
sidering the implications of these findings for the
580flexicurity literature and flexicurity policies.
The psychological and economic mediators be-
tween job insecurity and psychological well-being
were reviewed in the introduction to this paper. A
consensus of these theories was that the financial
585aspects of employment are only one part of the
reason why jobs (and, by extension, secure jobs)
are so protective of psychological well-being. By
this line of reasoning, flexicurity has only addressed
one aspect of job loss, and therefore can only be, at
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590 best, partially successful in removing the negative
effects of job insecurity. Other aspects of job loss,
such as the undermining of confidence and the loss
of valued colleagues, might be less tangible but
nevertheless just as challenging to psychological
595 well-being. Two quotes from the insecure male
respondents in Nolan’s (2009) analysis illustrate
these more psychological aspects of job insecurity:
To have a reasonably stable situation at home,
that’s the most important thing. A stable home
600 life and a stable situation and then obviously the
work is tied in because you can’t do it without
money, really. (187).
I felt that, although I was still the father and the
husband at home, whilst I wasn’t working, I
605 didn’t feel that I was the provider . I felt I
was letting them down.... My work provides
me with the wherewithal to give my family what
I believe they’re entitled to. (187)
The interesting thing about these quotes is that
610 they both contain reference to money, but both also
show how money cannot be divorced from wider
aspects of these individual’s lives. They do not just
require money to pay bills, but their provision of
money for the household is central to their identity
615 in their family lives. Thus, from these quotes (and
Nolan’s (2002) analysis of the open-ended ques-
tions in a larger survey) it can be argued that the
economic security provided under flexicurity poli-
cies might only partially address insecure employ-
620 ees concerns about the possible loss of their jobs.
Other responses in Nolan (2002) more clearly em-
phasise that they feel job insecurity threatens their
self-esteem or that they particularly enjoy aspects of
their current job.
625 Furthermore, even without thinking to the future,
many accounts of day-to-day living in insecure jobs
hint at the non-economic costs of job insecurity. For
instance, some employees say they feel the need to
work longer hours, even though there might be less
630 work to do, because they think that by appearing to
be hard-working they will be perceived as indis-
pensable. Others state explicitly that they find it
difficult to work well when they are insecure or
state that job insecurity makes their jobs more
635stressed or pressured. Furthermore, there have been
reports that, as employers downsize in times of re-
cession, providing good working conditions
becomes less of a priority to employers.
Flexicurity—an uncritical acceptance
640The data presented in this paper provide a strong
critique of just one aspect of flexicurity policies.
One might expect that, given the centrality of flex-
icurity policies for EU policy since 2005, this one
attack might be a drop in the ocean compared to
645a wealth of supporting evidence for the well-being
benefits of flexicurity. But, strangely, this is not the
case. There seems to be a complete vacuum in the
space where one would expect to see the rigorous
tests of the claims of the benefits of flexicurity for
650psychological well-being.While there is no shortage
of discussions of flexicurity in policy debates, there
is a dearth of evidence to back up those claims.
Perhaps the reason for this premature and uncrit-
ical adoption of flexicurity is that it is politically
655convenient for European employment policy. Anto-
niades (2008) argues that before the arrival of the
flexicurity model and debate, much after Cold War
employment policy debate at the EU level was char-
acterised by antagonism between competing An-
660glo-Saxon and Continental camps, with little
possibility of arriving at a compromise between
two extremes. Whereas national governments have
political systems that permit a strong government to
lead decisively even when the voting public is split
665evenly on an issue, the same is not true of the EU,
which relies on a high degree of consensus between
member states. Consequently, as long as arguments
were being played out along the old battle-lines of
the Anglo-Saxon model versus the Continental
670model, the low road versus the high road to success
or promoting flexibility versus promoting security,
the institutions for determining employment policy
were in a stalemate. But, as Antoniades argues, the
flexicurity model offered a way forward that was
675not fundamentally at odds with either the Anglo-
Saxon or the Continental models, yet permitted
a clear European position that was distinct from
a US-type capitalism.
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Such is the enthusiasm in the EU for flexicurity,
680 documents are written in a way that, far from show-
ing a healthy scepticism concerning the claims of
flexicurity, the policies are promoted with an evan-
gelical zeal, using terms like ‘‘Mission for Flexicur-
ity’’ (Council of the European Union, 2008) using
685 emphatic statements like ‘‘. flexicurity is without
doubt the strategy that European labour markets
must adopt in order to adapt to new requirements,
.’’(4) and welcomed the fact that it had ‘‘in-
creased its legitimacy’’ through the ‘‘participation
690 of the European social partners’’ (5).
A problem with such a convenient political solu-
tion is that it is in danger of uncritical acceptance,
without a careful analysis of the extent to which its
claims are consistent with the evidence. Thus, the
695 literature on flexicurity is not short on contributions
that highlight its claimed advantages, but is short on
attempts to test the specific claims that it makes
regarding the benefits for the welfare of employees.
This paper has analysed real data to explore the
700 evidence for one of the claimed benefits of flexicur-
ity policies and found it difficult to find support for
that claim.
Of course, to fail to find something does not prove
that it does not exist. It may be that this paper looks in
705 the wrong place, or through the wrong lens. For in-
stance, the spatial units utilised in the analyses were
countries in the first sets of analyses and clusters of
countries in the second set. But both of these units
can be problematic, and different components of
710 flexicurity models are set at different geographic
units. For instance, some policies are set, albeit at
an abstract level, at the level of the EU (perhaps ex-
plainingwhy Turkey is clearly separate in Figure 2?).
Other relevant policies, such as labour law and EPL
715 tend to be set at the national level, and training and
other active labour market policies might have
a high degree of regional autonomy. For instance,
Scarpa (2009) argues that the Swedish and Finnish
welfare systems show clear local variation, calling
720 into question the main focus in the literatures on
welfare regimes which is overwhelmingly at the
national level. This is an example, perhaps½AQ5 typical
of many sociological analyses that Lobao et al.
(2008) argue, that would be better aimed at the
725sub-national level, but this is rarely achieved in
practice in sociological literatures. For the purposes
of the present study, the existing data sets are lim-
ited by sample size for localised analyses, but some
sub-national unit that achieves a compromise be-
730tween sample size and territorial specificity just
might provide the evidence that has eluded the anal-
yses in this paper. And, if the data were available,
a longitudinal dimension to these analyses, so that
business cycles could be controlled for, would also
735be an improvement.
It is clear from this failure to find the support for
this model, whatever the reason, that further empir-
ical analyses to test this claimed benefit of flexicur-
ity (and the other claimed benefits) are urgently
740needed to evaluate the desired benefits of this
widely accepted set of policies. Until such policies
are evaluated, the suggestion that flexicurity poli-
cies can succeed by exchanging poor job security
for high employment security should be treated as
745an untested hypothesis rather than as the basis for
EU employment policy. The flexicurity policy
debates have provided a great opportunity for
interdisciplinary social science researchers to eval-
uate and refine those policies, thereby contributing
750to dispassionate academic analysis and debate. Un-
fortunately, they have, on the whole, been slow to
accept this challenge.
Endnotes
1 Job insecurity measures typically provide highly skew-
755ed data, as only a minority of respondents are insecure
or very insecure. To ensure that this skew does not cause
statistical problems or artefacts, Spearman’s q non-
parametric correlations are used for the EWCS4 data. In
using the ESS3 data, the ‘‘very insecure’’ group are ar-
760guably too small to be treated as a separate group, so they
have been recoded into the ‘‘insecure’’ batch for the
ANOVAs and in the Figures 6 and 7.
2 This category is for the non-employed and unemployed,
which are not sampled in the EWCS. These were, of
765course, excluded from the analyses.
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